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Abstract
We present some modifications of the Hoede-Bakker index defined in a social network in which players may
influence each other. Due to influences of the other actors, the final decision of a player may be different from
his original inclination. The modifications presented in the paper are defined for an arbitrary probability
distribution over all inclination vectors. In particular, they concern the situation in which the inclination
vectors may be not equally probable. Furthermore, by assuming special probability distributions over all
inclination vectors, we construct modifications of the Hoede-Bakker index that coincide with the Shapley-
Shubik index and with the Holler-Packel index, respectively. We present a practical example in which the
concepts in question are applied to Dutch parties, and a theoretical example in which we show how the
modifications can be calculated.
Key words: Hoede-Bakker index, inclination vector, probability distribution, Shapley-Shubik index, Holler-
Packel index
1 Introduction
The point of departure for this paper is the concept of decisional power (Hoede and Bakker 1982), called
also the Hoede-Bakker index. This concept is defined for calculating ‘power’ in a social network, in which
players make an acceptance-rejection decision, and they may influence each other when making such a
decision. One of the main notions in this framework is the concept of an inclination vector which indicates
the inclinations of all players to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Due to the influence among players, the (final) decision
of a player may be different from his (original) inclination. Based on the decisions of all players, a group
decision (‘yes’ or ‘no’) is made. In Hoede and Bakker (1982) it is assumed that all inclination vectors are
equally probable. In Rusinowska and De Swart (2007), some properties of the Hoede-Bakker index have
been analyzed, with a focus on the postulates for power indices and the voting power paradoxes displayed by
this index. In Rusinowska and De Swart (2006), the authors generalize the Hoede-Bakker index, by relaxing
one of the originally imposed assumptions. As has been shown in Rusinowska (2008), this generalization
measures a kind of ‘net’ Success, i.e., ‘Success - Failure’, but if all inclination vectors are equally probable,
then this generalization happens to measure ‘Decisiveness’, and consequently coincides with the absolute
Banzhaf index (Banzhaf 1965). By a successful player (given an inclination vector) we mean a player
whose inclination coincides with the group decision. A player is said to be decisive if he is successful and
changing his inclination makes the group decision change as well. Success (Decisiveness) of a player is
defined as a probability that the player is successful (decisive). In Rusinowska and De Swart (2006) also
some modifications of the decisional power that coincide respectively with the Rae index (Rae 1969), the
Coleman indices (Coleman 1971, 1986), and the Ko¨nig-Bra¨uninger index (Ko¨nig and Bra¨uninger 1998), are
proposed. These modifications are defined under the assumption that all inclination vectors are equally
probable.
The aim of this paper is to introduce and analyze modified indices, based on the Hoede-Bakker set-up,
that would measure decisional power in a social network in which inclination vectors do not have to be equally
probable. To the best of our knowledge, such modifications in networks have not been introduced before.
Moreover, since the assumption of the uniform probability distribution over all inclination vectors is quite
restrictive, investigating the modified indices that allow for an arbitrary probability distribution is important,
both from a theoretical point of view as well as from a point of view of the applicability of the measure
in question. In the paper, first we propose four modifications of the Hoede-Bakker index for an arbitrary
probability distribution over all inclination vectors. The most straightforward modification, obtained just by
incorporating an arbitrary probability distribution into the definition of the Hoede-Bakker index, does not
measure Decisiveness in general. Nevertheless, we deliver a necessary and sufficient condition under which
this modification coincides with Decisiveness. Obviously, this condition is satisfied if all inclination vectors
are equally probable. We also define three other modifications of the index, that are not that ‘elegant’
and straightforward as the modification mentioned above, but they are equal either to a probability that
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a player is decisive or to conditional probabilities that a player is decisive if he votes ‘yes’ (‘no’), for an
arbitrary probability distribution. Apart from defining the general modifications of the Hoede-Bakker index,
by choosing ‘proper’ probability distributions over all inclination vectors, we also define ‘a` la Shapley-Shubik’
and ‘a` la Holler-Packel’ indices for a social network. To be more precise, we define three modifications of
the decisional power index that coincide with the Shapley-Shubik index (Shapley and Shubik 1954), and a
modification which coincides with the Holler-Packel index (Holler 1982, Holler and Packel 1983).
When measuring ‘strength’ of political parties, the question about the motivation behind the coalition or
cabinet formation appears. In the framework of simple games, the concepts of the dominant player (Peleg
1981; see also Van Deemen 1989, 1997) and the central player (Einy 1985; Van Deemen 1991, 1997) have
been developed. While the dominant player is a ‘policy blind’ or ‘office seeking’ concept, the central player is
a ‘policy oriented’ or ‘policy seeking’ concept. A player k is said to be a dominant player if there are disjoint
coalitions A, B, such that k /∈ A ∪ B, A ∪ B is not a winning coalition, but A ∪ k and B ∪ k are winning
coalitions. In order to find the central player of a game, the players must be ordered on a relevant policy
dimension. The most simple way to get such an order of political parties is to use the ‘left-right’ scale (see,
e.g., Morgan 1976). Player k is said to be a central player if the connected coalition to the left of k as well as
the connected coalition to the right of k can turn into a winning coalition only when k joins this coalition.
In Van Roozendaal (1993) the concepts of the dominant player and the central player have been applied to
an analysis of Dutch parliament. In particular, the author analyzed all cabinets in the Netherlands between
1946 and 1989, and he came to the conclusion that ‘... the cabinet formation game in Dutch politics seems to
be much better described in terms of policy seeking motivation, as provided for in the central player theory,
than by office seeking motivations as provided for in the dominant player theory’ (Van Roozendaal 1993:
46-47). Nevertheless, one could easily imagine a cabinet or coalition formation whose driving force would be
better described in terms of office seeking motivations. And this brings us to a wide range of possibilities of
the Hoede-Bakker index concerning this issue. We like to stress that one of the advantages of the (modified)
Hoede-Bakker index is related to the question of parties’ motivations. Depending on how we define the
influence, the Hoede-Bakker index can cover both ‘policy blind’ and ‘policy seeking’ motivations.
In the voting power literature, a conceptual debate on power indices (such as the Shapley-Shubik and
Banzhaf indices) has been conducted in the course of more than ten years. The classical power indices
have been criticized on the grounds that they do not take into account players’ preferences (see, Garrett
and Tsebelis 1996, 1999a, 1999b, 2001; Tsebelis and Garrett 1996; but also Steunenberg et al. 1999; Napel
and Widgre´n 2001, 2002, 2004; Hosli 1997). The authors argue that since power indices are derived from
cooperative game theory, they do not take into account the strategic aspects of power in an institution, and
hence they are not appropriate to analyze the distribution of power. Consequently, several developments of
the classical power indices have been proposed, like introducing the so called strategic power indices derived
from non-cooperative game theory (Steunenberg et al. 1999), incorporating strategic aspects or preferences
into the classical power indices (Napel and Widgre´n 2001, 2002; Hosli 1997, 2002), developing a unified
framework which combines both cooperative and non-cooperative approaches (Napel and Widgre´n 2002). In
Braham and Holler (2005), this conceptual debate on power indices has been examined, and the impossibility
of a preference-based power index has been discussed. The authors argue that ‘if power is the ability of k
to affect an outcome, then a measure of k’s power must exclude any reference to k’s preference (behavioral
content) with respect to affecting that outcome’ (‘core theorem of the measurement of power’, Braham and
Holler 2005: 146). Napel and Widgre´n (2005) reply to these concerns on preference-based measures of power.
They argue that preferences are important in determining social interactions, and therefore the preferences
are also valuable in analyzing power. In this reply the authors present several convincing arguments in favor
of a preference-based analysis.
Related to the debate whether a preference-based power index is conceptually meaningful, we like to stress
the universal character of the Hoede-Bakker index. On the one hand, we can treat players’ inclinations as
preferences, and then according to Braham and Holler (2005), the (generalized or modified) Hoede-Bakker
index (as based on voters’ inclinations) could not be treated as a measure of power (defined as the ability of a
player to affect an outcome). On the other hand, it is possible to bring the concept of the (generalized) Hoede-
Bakker index closer to the measurement of power as defined above. In Rusinowska (2008) we propose the
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not-preference-based generalized Hoede-Bakker index, where feasible strategies instead of players’ inclinations
are considered. Instead of assuming that a player has the inclination to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’, we assume that
the player chooses a feasible strategy (which can be called just a strategy) from among two possibilities: I
will say ‘yes’, or I will say ‘no’. Choosing a strategy by a player is equivalent to the preliminary decision
of the player (i.e., his decision before any influence is executed) either to say ‘yes’ or to say ‘no’. As soon
as a player has made a preliminary decision about which strategy he chooses, a confrontation with real life
takes place, which may bring a lot of influences of the others. Due to such influences, the final decision of a
player may be different from his feasible strategy (meant as his preliminary decision). In Rusinowska (2008)
we argue that the inclinations of a player do not have to coincide with strategies of the player.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 concerns the probabilistic approach to power indices. In
Section 3, the generalized Hoede-Bakker index is recapitulated. In Section 4 we propose several modifications
of the generalized Hoede-Bakker index for an arbitrary probability distribution over the inclination vectors.
In the two following sections we choose the probability distributions under which the modifications defined
become an ‘a` la Shapley-Shubik index’ and an ‘a` la Holler-Packel index’ for a social network. While in
Section 5 we present modifications of the generalized Hoede-Bakker index that coincide with the Shapley-
Shubik index, Section 6 concerns a modification coinciding with the Holler-Packel index. In Section 7 we
present two examples that illustrate the concepts introduced. In Section 7.1 a practical example in which
the concepts in question are applied to Dutch parties is delivered. Section 7.2 presents a theoretical example,
showing how to calculate the introduced modifications. In Section 8, we conclude. The paper has also an
Appendix containing the proofs of all propositions.
2 Probabilistic approach to power indices
There are basically two approaches to power indices: the axiomatic approach and the probabilistic one. In
this research, we apply the probabilistic model for measuring ‘Decisiveness’ in voting situations presented in
Laruelle and Valenciano (2005). Below, we present the main concepts of this model.
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be the set of voters who have to vote (‘yes’ with abstention included or ‘no’) on a
submitted proposal. A vote configuration S is the result of voting in which all voters in S vote ‘yes’, and all
voters in N \ S vote ‘no’. Hence, k ∈ S means that voter k votes ‘yes’. A winning configuration is a vote
configuration leading to the passage of the proposal in question. LetW be the set of winning configurations.
The pair (N,W ) is called an N -voting rule. The following conditions are imposed: (i) N ∈ W ; (ii) ∅ /∈ W ;
(iii) If S ∈W , then T ∈W for any T containing S; (iv) If S ∈W , then N \ S /∈W . 1
A probability distribution over all possible vote configurations is assumed. It is represented by a map
p : 2N → [0, 1], associating with each vote configuration S ⊆ N its probability 0 ≤ p(S) ≤ 1 to occur, where∑
S⊆N p(S) = 1. That is, p(S) is the probability that all voters in S vote ‘yes’, and all voters in N \ S vote
‘no’. Let (W,p) be an N -voting situation, where W is the voting rule to be used and p is the probability
distribution over vote configurations, and let k ∈ N . Then:
Φk(W,p) := Prob(k is decisive) =
∑
S : k ∈ S ∈ W
S \ {k} /∈ W
p(S) +
∑
S : k /∈ S /∈ W
S ∪ {k} ∈ W
p(S) =
∑
S : k ∈ S ∈ W
S \ {k} /∈ W
(p(S) + p(S \ {k})) (1)
Φ+k (W,p) := Prob(k is decisive | k votes ‘yes
′) =
∑
S : k ∈ S ∈ W
S \ {k} /∈ W
p(S)∑
S:k∈S p(S)
(2)
Φ−k (W,p) := Prob(k is decisive | k votes ‘no
′) =
∑
S : k /∈ S /∈ W
S ∪ {k} ∈ W
p(S)∑
S:k/∈S p(S)
. (3)
1This condition is not necessary in this model.
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3 The generalized decisional power index
The concept of decisional power or the Hoede-Bakker index (Hoede and Bakker 1982) has been generalized
in Rusinowska and De Swart (2006). In this section, we recapitulate the definition of the generalized Hoede-
Bakker index. We consider a social network with n ≥ 2 players (actors, voters) who are to make a ‘yes’-‘no’
decision, and they may influence each other when making their decisions. Let N = {1, ..., n} be the set of
all players. Each actor has an inclination either to say ‘yes’ (denoted by +1) or ‘no’ (denoted by −1). Let i
be an inclination vector (i.e., an n-vector consisting of ones and minus ones and indicating the inclinations
of the actors), and let I denote the set of all inclination vectors. Of course, |I| = 2n. Due to influence
of the others, the final decision of an actor may be different from his original inclination. Each inclination
vector i ∈ I is then transformed into a decision vector b which is also an n-vector consisting of ones and
minus ones and indicating the decisions made by all players. Formally, there is an operator B : I → B(I),
that is, b = Bi, where B(I) denotes the set of all decision vectors. We also introduce the group decision
gd : B(I)→ {+1,−1} which is a function defined on the decision vectors b, having the value +1 if the group
decision is ‘yes’, and the value −1 if the group decision is ‘no’. We introduce the following notation. Let
i ≤ i′ ⇐⇒ {k ∈ N | ik = +1} ⊆{ k ∈ N | i
′
k = +1} (4)
i < i′ ⇐⇒ [i ≤ i′ ∧ i ,= i′]. (5)
Moreover, let i∅ = (−1, ...,−1) denote the inclination vector with negative inclinations of all voters, and let
iN = (+1, ...,+1) denote the inclination vector with positive inclinations of all voters. Let gd(B) be the
composition of B and gd. In Rusinowska and De Swart (2006), the following three conditions have been
imposed:
∀i ∈ I ∀i′ ∈ I [i ≤ i′ ⇒ gd(Bi) ≤ gd(Bi′)] (6)
gd(BiN ) = +1, gd(Bi∅) = −1, (7)
and the following definition has been introduced. Given gd(B), the generalized Hoede-Bakker index (the
generalized decisional power index) of player k ∈ N is given by
GHBk(gd(B)) :=
1
2n
· (
∑
{i: ik=+1}
gd(Bi)−
∑
{i: ik=−1}
gd(Bi)). (8)
As mentioned before, the generalized Hoede-Bakker index is a measure of Success − Failure (Rusinowska
2008), and this index measures Decisiveness (that is, it coincides with the absolute Banzhaf index) if all
inclination vectors are equally probable (Rusinowska and De Swart 2006).
4 Modifications of the Hoede-Bakker index for an arbitrary prob-
ability distribution
In modifications of the Hoede-Bakker index proposed in Rusinowska and De Swart (2006), all inclination
vectors are assumed to be equally probable, that is, the probability distribution over all inclination vectors
is the following:
p∗(i) :=
1
2n
for all i ∈ I. (9)
In this paper, we relax assumption (9) and propose several modifications of the generalized Hoede-Bakker
index that are defined for an arbitrary probability distribution p : I → [0, 1] over all inclination vectors.
Let k ∈ N and i = (i1, ..., in). By ik = (ik1 , ..., i
k
n) we denote the inclination vector resulting from i by
changing only ik, i.e.,
ikj =
{
ij if j ,= k
−ij if j = k
. (10)
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Similar as in Rusinowska and De Swart (2006), we introduce a bijection f : I → 2N between inclination
vectors and vote configurations (coalitions) which assigns to each inclination vector i the coalition consisting
of all voters with positive inclination in i, i.e., for all i ∈ I,
f(i) = {k ∈ N | ik = +1}. (11)
Let for each i ∈ I, |i| denote the number of all voters with positive inclination in i,
|i| := |f(i)| = |{k ∈ N | ik = +1}|. (12)
Moreover, given gd(B), we say that:
• coalition f(i) (equivalently, inclination vector i ∈ I) is winning (f(i) ∈W ) iff gd(Bi) = +1;
• f(i) (equivalently, i ∈ I) is losing iff gd(Bi) = −1;
• f(i) (equivalently, i ∈ I) is minimal winning iff gd(Bi) = +1 and for each i′ < i, gd(Bi′) = −1.
In other words, an inclination vector i is winning if it leads to a positive group decision, and it is losing
otherwise (i.e., if it leads to a negative group decision). A minimal winning inclination vector is a winning
inclination vector such that if at least one player with positive inclination changes his inclination to the
negative one, then the group decision changes to ‘no’. By Imw we denote the set of all minimal winning
inclination vectors, that is,
Imw := {i ∈ I | gd(Bi) = +1 ∧ ∀i′ < i [gd(Bi′) = −1]}. (13)
|Imw| denotes the number of minimal winning inclination vectors. We assume that the probability distribu-
tion p over all inclination vectors is the same as the probability distribution over all corresponding coalitions,
that is,
∀i ∈ I [p(i) = p(f(i))], (14)
and, consequently, ∑
i∈I
p(i) = 1, (15)
where 0 ≤ p(i) ≤ 1 denotes the probability that the inclination vector i occurs, and f is defined in (11). We
impose conditions (6) and (7), and by replacing equal probabilities of the inclination vectors in the definition
of the generalized Hoede-Bakker index by an arbitrary probability distribution, we introduce the following
straightforward modification of this index.
Definition 4.1 Given gd(B) and probability distribution p over all inclination vectors, for each k ∈ N :
Γk(gd(B), p) :=
∑
{i: ik=+1}
p(i) · gd(Bi)−
∑
{i: ik=−1}
p(i) · gd(Bi). (16)
Since gd(Bi) ∈ {−1,+1} for i ∈ I, we get, for each k ∈ N , Γk(gd(B), p) ≤ 1. Unfortunately, for an arbitrary
p, Γk(gd(B), p) is not a power index measuring Decisiveness of player k any more, where (as mentioned
before) Decisiveness of k means that by changing the inclination of k, the group decision changes as well. In
particular, Γk(gd(B), p) may be even negative. Of course, by assuming some (sometimes artificial) conditions,
we get Γk(gd(B), p) ≥ 0 for k ∈ N . One may, for instance, impose a kind of ‘generalized’ version of (6), that
is,
∀i ∈ I ∀i′ ∈ I [i ≤ i′ ⇒ p(i) · gd(Bi) ≤ p(i′) · gd(Bi′)], (17)
and then get Γk(gd(B), p) ≥ 0 for each k ∈ N . However, not for all compositions gd(B) and probability
distributions p, condition (17) is satisfied. Let us take two inclination vectors i, i′ with positive probabilities
to occur such that i ≤ i′, i.e., i′ results from i by enlarging (or not changing) the set of potential ‘yes’ voters.
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First of all, according to (17), if i is winning, then i′ must be winning as well. Moreover, if both i and i′
are winning, then p(i) ≤ p(i′), i.e., the inclination vector i′ is at least as probable as i. On the other hand,
if both i and i′ are losing, then p(i) ≥ p(i′), i.e., i is at least as probable as the inclination vector i′. This
seems to suggest that the relation between probabilities of voters’ inclinations depends on the final results
of voting, that is, on the group decisions these inclinations lead to. In other words, the more potential ‘yes’
voters form a winning coalition, the more probable this coalition is, and the more potential ‘yes’ voters form
a losing coalition, the less probable such a coalition is.
The question arises when Γk(gd(B), p) is equal to the probability that voter k is decisive. We assume
that a coalition is winning if and only if the inclination vector in which all members of that coalition have
positive inclination and all members outside the coalition have negative inclination, leads to the positive
group decision, i.e.,
S = f(i) ∈W ⇔ gd(Bi) = +1. (18)
Given the relation (18) between W and gd(B), we have
Proposition 4.1 Given gd(B), W and p, for each k ∈ N
Γk(gd(B), p) = Φk(W,p) ⇔
∑
{i: ik=+1}
(p(i)− p(ik)) · (gd(Bi) + gd(Bik)) = 0. (19)
According to condition (19), if, in particular, all inclination vectors are equally probable, that is, the prob-
ability distribution satisfies condition (9), then Γk(gd(B), p) does measure Decisiveness of voter k. This
is, of course, consistent with the result proved in Rusinowska and De Swart (2006) that the generalized
Hoede-Bakker index GHBk(gd(B)) recapitulated in (8) is equal to the probability that player k is decisive.
Since Γk coincides with Decisiveness of k only under condition (19), we propose also other modifications
of the Hoede-Bakker index. In these modifications, for each player k, we take into account at the same time
the group decisions resulting from some inclination vectors i, and the group decisions resulting from ik (that
is, from the inclination vectors obtained from i by changing only the inclination ik of player k). This is
related to the definition of a decisive player who, by changing solely his inclination, makes the group decision
change as well. As before, we impose conditions (6) and (7), and introduce the following definitions.
Definition 4.2 Given gd(B) and probability distribution p over all inclination vectors, for each k ∈ N :
Ψk(gd(B), p) :=
∑
{i: ik=+1}
p(i) + p(ik)
2
· (gd(Bi)− gd(Bik)) (20)
Ψ+k (gd(B), p) :=
∑
{i: ik=+1}
p(i) · (gd(Bi)− gd(Bik))
2
∑
{i: ik=+1}
p(i)
(21)
Ψ−k (gd(B), p) :=
∑
{i: ik=−1}
p(i) · (gd(Bik)− gd(Bi))
2
∑
{i: ik=−1}
p(i)
. (22)
Of course, since gd(Bi) ∈ {−1,+1} for i ∈ I, and by virtue of (6), we have for each gd(B), p, and k ∈ N ,
0 ≤ Ψk(gd(B), p) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ Ψ
+
k (gd(B), p) ≤ 1, and 0 ≤ Ψ
−
k (gd(B), p) ≤ 1. Although these modifications are
not that ‘elegant’ and straightforward as Γ, they always coincide with Decisiveness of player k. Given (18),
we have
Proposition 4.2 Given gd(B), W and p, for each k ∈ N
Ψk(gd(B), p) = Φk(W,p) (23)
Ψ+k (gd(B), p) = Φ
+
k (W,p) (24)
Ψ−k (gd(B), p) = Φ
−
k (W,p). (25)
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According to (23), the modification Ψk is always equal to the probability that player k is decisive. Result
(24) says that Ψ+k is equal to the conditional probability that player k is decisive under the condition that k
votes ‘yes’. Similarly, (25) means that Ψ−k is the conditional probability that player k is decisive if k votes
‘no’.
5 Modifications leading to the Shapley-Shubik index
One of the most well-known power indices presented in the literature on voting power is the Shapley-Shubik
index (Shapley and Shubik 1954). Using notations from Section 2, this index is defined as follows. For a
given voting rule W , the Shapley-Shubik index, for each k ∈ N , is given by
Shk(W ) =
∑
S : k ∈ S ∈ W
S \ {k} /∈ W
(n− |S|)! · (|S|− 1)!
n!
, (26)
where |S| denotes the number of voters voting ‘yes’.
We would like to extend our work done in Rusinowska and De Swart (2006), in which modifications of
the generalized Hoede-Bakker index that coincide with the Rae index, the Coleman indices, and the Ko¨nig-
Bra¨uninger index are presented. The question appears whether by choosing ‘proper’ probability distributions
over all inclination vectors, our modifications of the generalized Hoede-Bakker index may coincide with the
Shapley-Shubik index. First, we introduce some notation. Let for x ∈ N
Even(x, x+ 1) =
{
x if x is even
x+ 1 if x is odd
(27)
and
Odd(x, x+ 1) =
{
x if x is odd
x+ 1 if x is even
. (28)
Given (18), we have
Proposition 5.1 Ψk(gd(B), pSh) = Shk(W ) for all k ∈ N , gd(B) and W if and only if
1
n+ 1
· (1−
1( n
Even([n
2
],[n
2
]+1)
) ) ≤ pSh(i∅) ≤ 1
n+ 1
· (
1( n
Odd([n
2
],[n
2
]+1)
) + 1), (29)
and
pSh(i) =


1
n+1 · (
1
( n|i|)
− 1) + pSh(i∅) if |i| is even
1
n+1 · (
1
( n|i|)
+ 1)− pSh(i∅) if |i| is odd
. (30)
In particular, Ψk(gd(B), pSh) = Shk(W ) for all k ∈ N , gd(B) and W if for each i ∈ I
pSh(i) =
1
n+ 1
·
1(n
|i|
) . (31)
In Proposition 5.1, we present sufficient and necessary conditions for the probability distribution under which
the modification Ψk of the Hoede-Bakker index coincides with the Shapley-Shubik index Shk of player k.
According to these conditions, the probability of the inclination vector i takes one of the two forms, depending
on whether the number of potential ‘yes’ voters in i is even or odd; see equation (30). Each possibility for
pSh(i) given in (30) depends on the probability of the inclination vector i∅ in which all players have negative
inclination. Inequality (29) gives the range for the probability of i∅. In particular, Ψk and Shk coincide
when the probability pSh(i∅) is equal to 1n+1 (which of course belongs to the interval given in (29)). In such
a case, the probability distribution pSh(i) over all inclination vectors i is given in (31).
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Proposition 5.2 Ψ+k (gd(B), p
Sh) = Shk(W ) for all k ∈ N , gd(B) and W iff 0 ≤ pSh(i∅) < 1 and for any
i ,= i∅
pSh(i) = (1− pSh(i∅)) ·
1
|i|∑n
t=1
1
t
·
1(n
|i|
) . (32)
In particular, Ψ+k (gd(B), p
Sh) = Shk(W ) for k ∈ N , gd(B) and W if pSh(i∅) = 0 and for any i ,= i∅
pSh(i) =
1
|i|∑n
t=1
1
t
·
1(n
|i|
) . (33)
Proposition 5.2 is similar to Proposition 5.1, but now we deliver sufficient and necessary conditions for the
probability distribution under which the modification Ψ+k (defined in (21)) coincides with the Shapley-Shubik
index Shk of player k. According to these conditions, the probability of the inclination vector i∅ is arbitrary
(but smaller then 1), and the probability of the inclination vector i also depends on the probability of i∅,
and it is given in (32). In particular, Ψ+k and Shk coincide when the probability p
Sh(i∅) that all players
have negative inclination is equal to 0. In this case, (33) presents the probability distribution p(i) over all
inclination vectors i.
Proposition 5.3 Ψ−k (gd(B), p
Sh) = Shk(W ) for all k ∈ N , gd(B) and W iff 0 ≤ pSh(iN ) < 1 and for any
i ,= iN
pSh(i) = (1− pSh(iN )) ·
1
n−|i|∑n
t=1
1
t
·
1(n
|i|
) . (34)
In particular, Ψ−k (gd(B), p
Sh) = Shk(W ) for k ∈ N , gd(B) and W if pSh(iN ) = 0 and for any i ,= iN
pSh(i) =
1
n−|i|∑n
t=1
1
t
·
1(n
|i|
) . (35)
The results presented in Proposition 5.3 are symmetric to the ones shown in Proposition 5.2, and they
give sufficient and necessary conditions for the probability distribution under which the modification Ψ−k
(defined in (22)) coincides with the Shapley-Shubik index Shk. The probability of the inclination vector iN
under which all players have positive inclination is arbitrary (but smaller then 1). The probability of the
inclination vector i depends on the probability of iN , and it is now given in (34). In particular, Ψ−k and Shk
coincide when the probability pSh(iN ) that all players have positive inclination is equal to 0. The probability
distribution pSh(i) over all inclination vectors i is then presented in (35).
6 Modification leading to the Holler-Packel index
Another power index analyzed in the literature is the Holler-Packel index (Holler 1982, Holler and Packel
1983), an index referring to minimal winning configurations. A winning configuration is minimal if it does
not contain properly any other winning configuration. The Holler-Packel index is based on the following
assumptions: only minimal winning configurations will be formed, all minimal winning configurations are
equally probable, all voters in a minimal winning coalition get the undivided coalition value.
LetM(W ) be the set of all minimal winning configurations. Letm(W ) and mk(W ) denote the number of
minimal winning configurations and the number of minimal winning configurations containing voter k ∈ N ,
respectively. For a given voting rule W , the non-normalized Holler-Packel index, for each k ∈ N , is defined
by
HPk(W ) =
mk(W )
m(W )
, (36)
and the Holler-Packel index, for each k ∈ N , is given by
H˜P k(W ) =
HPk(W )∑
j∈N HPj(W )
=
mk(W )∑
j∈N mj(W )
. (37)
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One of our modifications of the generalized decisional power index coincides with the non-normalized
Holler-Packel index. We have
Proposition 6.1 Ψk(gd(B), pHP ) = HPk(W ) for all k ∈ N , gd(B) and W , where for each i ∈ I
pHP (i) =
{ 1
|Imw| if i ∈ I
mw
0 if i ,∈ Imw
, (38)
and Imw denotes the set of all minimal winning inclination vectors (as defined in (13)). According to
Proposition 6.1, the modification Ψk (defined in (20)) of the Hoede-Bakker index coincides with the non-
normalized Holler-Packel index HPk if the probability distribution over all inclination vectors is given by
(38). According to condition (38), pHP is the uniform probability distribution among all minimal winning
inclination vectors (i.e., the inclination vectors i that lead to a positive group decision, but if at least one
player in i with positive inclination switches to a negative one, then the new inclination vector leads to a
negative group decision). Consequently, equation (38) assigns probability 0 to all inclination vectors that
are not minimal winning.
7 Examples
In order to illustrate the concept of the (modified) Hoede-Bakker index, we present two examples. In Section
7.1 an application of the Hoede-Bakker index to the Dutch data used in Van Roozendaal (1993) is shown,
while in Section 7.2 we present a theoretical example showing how all the calculations related to the modified
Hoede-Bakker index are made.
7.1 Practical example
Let us consider an example based on the structure of the Second Chamber (Tweede Kamer) of the Dutch
Parliament after the elections in 1956. There were 7 parties in the parliament at that time:
PvdA - Labor Party
KVP - Catholic People’s Party
ARP - Anti-Revolutionary Party
CHU - Christian Historical Union
VVD - People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy
CPN - Communist Party
SGP - Political Reformed Party
and therefore,
N = {PvdA,KVP,ARP,CHU,VVD,CPN,SGP}.
Based on a left-right scale for the postwar period in the Netherlands, developed in Morgan (1976) (see also
Van Roozendaal (1993)), the following placement of the parties is constructed:
CPN - PvdA - KVP - ARP - CHU - VVD - SGP
Table 1 shows the Dutch parties in the Parliament (k ∈ N) after the Dutch election in 1956, placed in the
order mentioned above, together with the numbers of seats (wk). In 1956 the total number of seats raised
from 100 to 150.
After the 1956 election, in the beginning the cabinet consisted of PvdA (dominant party), KVP (central
party), ARP, and CHU, but this cabinet fell after slightly more than 2 months. A new cabinet was constructed
which consisted of KVP, ARP, and CHU only. Let us apply the concepts introduced in the paper to this
Dutch parliament.
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Table 1: The Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament (election year 1956)
k ∈ N CPN PvdA KVP ARP CHU VVD SGP
wk 7 50 49 15 13 13 3
Table 2: The generalized Hoede-Bakker index GHBk and its modification Γk, k ∈ N
k ∈ N CPN PvdA KVP ARP CHU VVD SGP
GHBk(gd(B)) 0 0.5 0.5 0.333 0.333 0.333 0
Γk(gd(B), p˜) 0.2 0.6 1 1 1 0.6 0.2
Γ′k(gd(B), p̂) 0.333 0.666 1 0.833 0.666 0.333 0
When applying the standard power indices, we receive the information, in particular, about power, i.e.,
about Decisiveness of each party. Some of the modifications of the Hoede-Bakker index coincide with the
standard power indices, assuming that relation (18) holds. In particular, if we additionally assume that all
inclination vectors are equally probable, then the modification Ψk expresses Decisiveness of player k.
When applying the modifications of the Hoede-Bakker index to the framework of a social network, an
arbitrary probability distribution can be considered as well, and with some probability distributions, these
modifications lead to the standard power indices. In particular, if (18) is satisfied and the probability of each
inclination vector i is given in (31), where n = 7, then Ψk coincides with the Shapley-Shubik index, while
with the probability of each inclination vector i given in (38), where Imw is the set of all minimal winning
inclination vectors, |Imw| = 8, we receive the non-normalized Holler-Packel index.
Depending on how the influence function is defined, the modified Hoede-Bakker index can cover different
motivations of players. Let us illustrate this point in our example. First, we assume that every party has
office seeking motivations, and the decision of a party is always equal to the inclination of a coalition having
in total more than 75 seats in parliament. Consequently, the decision of each party coincides with the group
decision, i.e., for each i ∈ I and k ∈ N ,
(Bi)k =
{
+1 if
∑
j:ij=+1
wj ≥ 76
−1 otherwise
= gd(Bi).
Suppose that all inclination vectors are equally probable. The generalized Hoede-Bakker indices for this
case are presented in Table 2. If by a successful player under i we mean a player k whose inclination ik
coincides with the group decision gd(Bi), and by a player who fails we mean a player who is not successful,
then as we already know GHBk measures a kind of ‘net’ Success of k (i.e., Success − Failure). We can then
conclude from Table 2 that both CPN and SGP (whose generalized Hoede-Bakker index is equal to 0) are
successful in 50% of the inclination vectors, and they fail in the remaining 50%. Concerning ARP, CHU,
and VVD, each of these parties achieves Success in 23 of the inclination vectors, and fails in
1
3 of them. The
most successful players are PvdA and KVP: their inclinations coincide with the group decision in 75% of the
inclination vectors, and they are different from the group decision in 25%.
Suppose now that the parties have some policy seeking motivations, and that the inclination vectors are
not all equally probable. It is reasonable to assume that:
(i) The three main religious parties, KVP, ARP, and CHU2 have the same inclinations.
(ii) The inclinations of the parties are ‘coherent’ in the sense that considering the left-right placement of
the parties, if one party, say party k, has an inclination different from the inclination of its ‘neighbor’
to the left, then all the parties to the right of k have the same inclination as k.
2In 1977 these parties joined and formed CDA - Christian Democratic Appeal
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Table 3: The inclination vectors satisfying (i)-(iii), I˜
(iCPN, iPvdA, iKVP, iARP, iCHU, iVVD, iSGP) (iCPN, iPvdA, iKVP, iARP, iCHU, iVVD, iSGP)
(+1,+1,+1,+1,+1,+1,+1) (−1,−1,−1,−1,−1,−1,−1)
(+1,+1,+1,+1,+1,+1,−1) (−1,−1,−1,−1,−1,−1,+1)
(−1,+1,+1,+1,+1,+1,+1) (+1,−1,−1,−1,−1,−1,−1)
(+1,+1,+1,+1,+1,−1,−1) (−1,−1,−1,−1,−1,+1,+1)
(−1,−1,+1,+1,+1,+1,+1) (+1,+1,−1,−1,−1,−1,−1)
(iii) All inclination vectors that satisfy (i) and (ii) have the same positive probability to occur, and the
probability of each of the remaining inclination vectors is equal to 0.
Table 3 presents the set I˜ of all inclination vectors with a positive probability occurring in this situation.
The probability distribution for this case is equal to
p˜(i) =
{
0.1 if i ∈ I˜
0 otherwise
. (39)
We can apply now the modification Γk for the situation in which the probability distribution over all in-
clination vectors is given by (39). The results are presented in Table 2. As we can see from this table,
by considering only ‘coherent’ inclinations, all players gained, i.e., the modification Γk is greater than the
generalized Hoede-Bakker index GHBk, for each k ∈ N . In particular, thanks to the assumption (i), the
three religious parties got the highest value of Γk: their inclination always coincides with the group decision.
It is also related to the position of KVP, which was the central party in this parliament. Since the connected
coalition to the left of KVP as well as the connected coalition to the right of KVP can turn into a winning
coalition only when KVP joins this coalition, then together with the assumptions imposed in this case, KVP,
and consequently also ARP and CHU, are always successful.
We can keep the assumptions (ii) and (iii), but relax assumption (i), and instead of (i) assume that the
inclination vectors in which not all three parties KVP, ARP, and CHU have the same inclinations are less
probable than the other inclination vectors. Let
Î = {(−1,−1,−1,+1,+1,+1,+1), (+1,+1,+1,+1,−1,−1,−1),
(−1,−1,−1,−1,+1,+1,+1), (+1,+1,+1,−1,−1,−1,−1)}
Suppose that the set of all inclination vectors with a positive probability occurring in this situation is equal
to I˜ ∪ Î, and the probability distribution is the following:
p̂(i) =


1
12 if i ∈ I˜
1
24 if i ∈ Î
0 otherwise
. (40)
We can calculate the modification Γ′k for this case; see Table 2. KVP did not lose anything in this case,
i.e., this party is always successful (Γ′KV P (gd(B), p̂) = 1). Moreover, both parties to the left of KVP, that
is, CPN and PvdA gained in terms of ‘net’ Success. This can be explained by the fact that all inclination
vectors in Î that are added to the considerations, count for Success of CPN and PvdA. The situation of each
party to the right of KVP, that is, ARP, CHU, VVD and SGP became worse now: they all lose in terms
of ‘net’ Success, but ARP lost relatively less than the remaining parties. This is related to the fact that all
inclination vectors in Î count for a Failure of CHU, VVD and SGP, while for ARP, two of these inclination
vectors are related to Success of ARP, and the remaining two are related to Failure of this party.
As one hopefully sees, the applications of the modified Hoede-Bakker index are very broad, and they may
cover many situations. What is important here is to impose assumptions on the influence and probability
distribution that will be appropriate for a given situation. Let us now illustrate in another example how the
calculations on the modifications can be conducted.
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Table 4: Group decision for Figure 1
inclination i Bi gd(Bi) inclination i Bi gd(Bi)
iN = (1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1) +1 i∅ = (−1,−1,−1) (−1,−1,−1) −1
i(1) = (1, 1,−1) (1, 1, 1) +1 i(6) = (−1,−1, 1) (−1,−1,−1) −1
i(2) = (1,−1, 1) (1,−1, 1) +1 i(5) = (−1, 1,−1) (−1, 1,−1) −1
i(3) = (−1, 1, 1) (−1, 1, 1) +1 i(4) = (1,−1,−1) (1,−1,−1) −1
7.2 Theoretical example
We consider a very simple example of a three-voter social network presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Three-voter social network
!
1
!
2
! 3
!
!
!"
#
#
#$
The set of voters is equal to N = {1, 2, 3}, and both voters 1 and 2 influence voter 3. If voters 1 and 2 are
unanimous with respect to their inclinations (that is, they have the same inclination), voter 3 will follow the
influence of voters 1 and 2. Otherwise, voter 3 will follow his own inclination. Moreover, suppose that the
group decision is a simple majority. We can write then the decision vector:
Bi = b = (b1, b2, b3) =
{
(i1, i2, i1) if i1 = i2
(i1, i2, i3) if i1 ,= i2
,
and the group decision
∀i ∈ I [gd(Bi) = +1 ⇔ |{k ∈ N | bk = 1}| ≥ 2].
Table 4 presents the group decision for our example.
Suppose now that we have a certain probability distribution p over all eight inclination vectors. Using
formula (16) of the modification Γk, we get the following:
Γ1(gd(B), p) = p(i
N ) + p(i(1)) + p(i(2))− p(i(3))− p(i(4)) + p(i(5)) + p(i(6)) + p(i∅)
Γ2(gd(B), p) = p(i
N ) + p(i(1))− p(i(2)) + p(i(3)) + p(i(4))− p(i(5)) + p(i(6)) + p(i∅)
Γ3(gd(B), p) = p(i
N )− p(i(1)) + p(i(2)) + p(i(3)) + p(i(4)) + p(i(5))− p(i(6)) + p(i∅).
Next, we like to check when modification Γk coincides with Φk, that is, when Γk measures Decisiveness of
voter k ∈ N . By virtue of Proposition 4.1, we get the following conditions:

Γ1(gd(B), p) = Φ1(W,p)
Γ2(gd(B), p) = Φ2(W,p)
Γ3(gd(B), p) = Φ3(W,p)
⇔


p(iN )− p(i(3)) = p(i(4))− p(i∅)
p(iN )− p(i(2)) = p(i(5))− p(i∅)
p(iN )− p(i(1)) = p(i(6))− p(i∅)
⇔
p(iN ) + p(i∅) = p(i(3)) + p(i(4)) = p(i(2)) + p(i(5)) = p(i(1)) + p(i(6)) =
1
4
. (41)
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For each probability distribution p which satisfies (41), the modification Γk, coinciding with Decisiveness of
player k, is equal to
Γk(gd(B), p) = Φk(W,p) =
1
2
for each k ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
One of the probability distributions satisfying (41) is p∗ defined by equation (9). We can also consider the
modifications Ψk defined in (20). We have
Ψ1(gd(B), p) = p(i
(1)) + p(i(5)) + p(i(2)) + p(i(6))
Ψ2(gd(B), p) = p(i
(1)) + p(i(4)) + p(i(3)) + p(i(6))
Ψ3(gd(B), p) = p(i
(2)) + p(i(4)) + p(i(3)) + p(i(5))
For each probability distribution p which satisfies (41) we have,
Ψk(gd(B), p) =
1
2
for each k ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Next, we calculate when Ψk(gd(B), p) coincides with the Shapley-Shubik index Shk(W ). By virtue of (29)
and (30), we get Ψk(gd(B), pSh) = Shk(W ) for each k = 1, 2, 3 iff
1
6
≤ pSh(i∅) ≤
1
3
pSh(i) =


1
3 − p
Sh(i∅) for i ∈ {i(4), i(5), i(6)}
pSh(i∅)− 16 for i ∈ {i
(1), i(2), i(3)}
1
2 − p
Sh(i∅) for i = iN
. (42)
If the probability distribution satisfies (42), then
Ψk(gd(B), p
Sh) = Shk(W ) =
1
3
for each k = 1, 2, 3.
Moreover, by virtue of (21), we get formulas for the modification Ψ+k :
Ψ+1 (gd(B), p) =
p(i(1)) + p(i(2))
p(iN ) + p(i(1)) + p(i(2)) + p(i(4))
Ψ+2 (gd(B), p) =
p(i(1)) + p(i(3))
p(iN ) + p(i(1)) + p(i(3)) + p(i(5)))
Ψ+3 (gd(B), p) =
p(i(2)) + p(i(3))
p(iN ) + p(i(2)) + p(i(3)) + p(i(6))
By virtue of Proposition 5.2, Ψ+k (gd(B), p
Sh) = Shk(W ) for k = 1, 2, 3 iff
0 ≤ pSh(i∅) < 1
pSh(i) =
{ 2
11 · (1− p
Sh(i∅)) for i ∈ {i(4), i(5), i(6), iN}
1
11 · (1− p
Sh(i∅)) for i ∈ {i(1), i(2), i(3)}
, (43)
and if (43) is satisfied, then
Ψ+k (gd(B), p
Sh) = Shk(W ) =
1
3
for each k = 1, 2, 3.
Finally, from definition (22), we have
Ψ−1 (gd(B), p) =
p(i(5)) + p(i(6))
p(i(3)) + p(i(5)) + p(i(6)) + p(i∅)
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Ψ−2 (gd(B), p) =
p(i(4)) + p(i(6))
p(i(2)) + p(i(4)) + p(i(6)) + p(i∅)
Ψ−3 (gd(B), p) =
p(i(4)) + p(i(5))
p(i(1)) + p(i(4)) + p(i(5)) + p(i∅)
.
By virtue of Proposition 5.3, Ψ−k (gd(B), p
Sh) = Shk(W ) for k = 1, 2, 3 iff
0 ≤ pSh(iN ) < 1
pSh(i) =
{ 1
11 · (1− p
Sh(iN )) for i ∈ {i(4), i(5), i(6)}
2
11 · (1− p
Sh(iN )) for i ∈ {i∅, i(1), i(2), i(3)}
. (44)
If (44) is satisfied, then we also have
Ψ−k (gd(B), p
Sh) = Shk(W ) =
1
3
for each k = 1, 2, 3.
Finally, we want to calculate when Ψk(gd(B), p) coincides with the non-normalized Holler-Packel index. In
our example
Imw = {i(1), i(2), i(3)},
and hence, by virtue of Proposition 6.1, we get Ψk(gd(B), pHP ) = HPk(W ) for k = 1, 2, 3, where
pHP (i) =
{ 1
3 if i ∈ {i
(1), i(2), i(3)}
0 if i ∈ I \ {i(1), i(2), i(3)}
. (45)
Then, if (45) is satisfied, then we get
Ψk(gd(B), p
HP ) = HPk(W ) =
2
3
for each k = 1, 2, 3.
In these two examples, where the first one is based on real political data and the second one analyzes
a simple three-player network, the reader could hopefully see the advantages and innovative aspects of the
modifications of the Hoede-Bakker index proposed in this paper. Let us summarize these advantages in the
Conclusions drawn below.
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we consider measures of power for a social network in which groups of players have either
to accept or to reject a proposal. Each voter has an inclination either to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’, but he may
also be influenced by other voter(s), and consequently his final decision may be different from his (original)
inclination. To the best of our knowledge, the (generalized) Hoede-Bakker index was analyzed so far only
under the assumption of equally probable inclination vectors. The main aim of this paper is to generalize
the (generalized) Hoede-Bakker index by considering arbitrary probability distributions over all inclination
vectors. First, we define several modifications of the generalized decisional power index for an arbitrary
probability distribution. Next, by choosing ‘proper’ probability distributions, we construct measures that
coincide with the Shapley-Shubik index and with the Holler-Packel index. Finally, in order to illustrate the
notions introduced, we consider two simple examples.
What are the advantages and innovative aspects of the (modified) Hoede-Bakker index, and how can one
apply the insights provided in the paper? The main advantages of the index seem to be related to the general
character of the index. This generality comes from two elements in the framework: broadly defined influence
between agents, and an arbitrary probability distribution over all inclination vectors. First of all, by allowing
for an arbitrary probability distribution, the index can be applied to many situations: both real-life practical
examples and hypothetical theoretical networks. With some probability distributions, the modifications of
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the Hoede-Bakker index lead to the standard power indices, but now defined in the framework of a social
network with influence between agents. In particular, the generalized Hoede-Bakker index measures ‘net’
Success, but with the uniform probability distribution it also coincides with Decisiveness. Consequently,
it simplifies calculations when determining different measures in a social network, giving, in particular, an
immediate answer to the question of Decisiveness. It is sufficient to calculate Success of a player, which
immediately gives Failure, and therefore also ‘net’ Success and Decisiveness.
Another innovative aspect of the modified Hoede-Bakker indices is that depending on how the influence
function is defined, the framework may cover many different situations. In particular, different motivations
of players, i.e., both office seeking and policy seeking motivations, can be modeled within this framework.
Furthermore, as argued in the Introduction, the Hoede-Bakker index, originally defined in a framework
which takes preferences of parties into account, may also be re-defined without considering preferences.
In order to apply the presented concepts, one should first define well the situation which is analyzed, and
describe its main features. First, can we identify parties’ inclinations with respect to making a particular
decision? And if so, are the players influenced by the others? Do they (sometimes) decide differently from
their inclinations? Moreover, are all possible influence configurations equally probable? And if not, can we
describe the probability distribution over them? These are, in particular, the questions, which should be
answered before applying the insights provided in the paper. And when clear and appropriate answers can
be given, one can proceed with making the required calculations.
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Proof of Proposition 4.1
By virtue of (11) and (14), we have S = f(i) and p(S) = p(i) for each i ∈ I. Moreover, k ∈ S iff ik = +1;
k /∈ S iff ik = −1; S ∈W iff gd(Bi) = +1, S /∈W iff gd(Bi) = −1. Hence, by virtue of (1), we have then
Φk(W,p) =
∑
i : ik = +1
gd(Bi) = +1
gd(Bik) = −1
p(i) +
∑
i : ik = −1
gd(Bi) = −1
gd(Bik) = +1
p(i)
and therefore, since (6) is imposed,
Φk(W,p) =
∑
{i: ik=+1}
p(i) ·
gd(Bi)− gd(Bik)
2
+
∑
{i: ik=−1}
p(i) ·
gd(Bik)− gd(Bi)
2
. (46)
Hence,
Γk(gd(B), p) = Φk(W,p) ⇔∑
{i: ik=+1}
p(i) · gd(Bi) +
∑
{i: ik=+1}
p(i) · gd(Bik)−
∑
{i: ik=−1}
p(i) · gd(Bi)−
∑
{i: ik=−1}
p(i) · gd(Bik) = 0 ⇔
∑
{i: ik=+1}
p(i) · (gd(Bi) + gd(Bik))−
∑
{i: ik=+1}
p(ik) · (gd(Bik) + gd(Bi)) = 0 ⇔
∑
{i: ik=+1}
(p(i)− p(ik)) · (gd(Bi) + gd(Bik)) = 0.
!
Proof of Proposition 4.2
By virtue of (20) and (46), we have
Ψk(gd(B), p) =
∑
{i: ik=+1}
p(i) + p(ik)
2
· (gd(Bi)− gd(Bik)) =
=
∑
{i: ik=+1}
p(i) ·
gd(Bi)− gd(Bik)
2
+
∑
{i: ik=+1}
p(ik) ·
gd(Bi)− gd(Bik)
2
=
=
∑
{i: ik=+1}
p(i) ·
gd(Bi)− gd(Bik)
2
+
∑
{i: ik=−1}
p(i) ·
gd(Bik)− gd(Bi)
2
= Φk(W,p).
As stated in the proof of Proposition 4.1, ik = +1 iff k ∈ S. Moreover,
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(ik = +1 and gd(Bi) = +1 and gd(Bik) = −1) iff (k ∈ S ∈W and S \ {k} /∈W ).
Hence, by virtue of (21) and (2),
Ψ+k (gd(B), p) = (
∑
{i: ik=+1}
p(i) ·
gd(Bi)− gd(Bik)
2
) ·
1∑
{i: ik=+1}
p(i)
=
∑
S : k ∈ S ∈ W
S \ {k} /∈ W
p(S)∑
S:k∈S p(S)
= Φ+k (W,p).
By analogy, by virtue of (22) and (3),
Ψ−k (gd(B), p) = (
∑
{i: ik=−1}
p(i) ·
gd(Bik)− gd(Bi)
2
) ·
1∑
{i: ik=−1}
p(i)
=
∑
S : k /∈ S /∈ W
S ∪ {k} ∈ W
p(S)∑
S:k/∈S p(S)
= Φ−k (W,p).
!
Proof of Proposition 5.1
By virtue of Laruelle and Valenciano (2005), Shk(W ) = Φk(W,p) for all k and W if
p(S) =
1
n+ 1
·
1( n
|S|
) for S ⊆ N. (47)
Hence, applying (23) and (14), and replacing in (47) vote configuration S by inclination vector i, and |S| by
|i| (see (12)), we have for each k ∈ N , Ψk(gd(B), pSh) = Φk(W,pSh) = Shk(W ), where p is defined in (31).
Moreover, by virtue of Laruelle and Valenciano (2005), if p and p′ are two probability distributions, then
Φk(W,p) = Φk(W,p′) for every k ∈ N and every voting rule W iff for all S ,= ∅
p′(S) = p(S) + (−1)|S|+1 · (p(∅)− p′(∅)). (48)
Hence, Ψk(gd(B), p) = Ψk(gd(B), p′) for every k ∈ N and gd(B) iff for each i ,= i∅
p′(i) = p(i) + (−1)|i|+1 · (p(i∅)− p′(i∅)). (49)
By combining (31) and (49), we get (30). Taking into account that 0 ≤ p(i) ≤ 1 for each i ∈ I, and applying
this to (30), we get, for each i ∈ I such that |i| is even,
0 ≤
1
n+ 1
· (1−
1(n
|i|
) ) ≤ pSh(i∅) ≤ 1− 1
n+ 1
· (
1(n
|i|
) − 1),
and for each i ∈ I such that |i| is odd,
1
n+ 1
· (
1(n
|i|
) + 1)− 1 ≤ pSh(i∅) ≤ 1
n+ 1
· (
1(n
|i|
) + 1) ≤ 1.
Note that for each i ∈ I,
1−
1
n+ 1
· (
1(n
|i|
) − 1) ≥ 1, 1
n+ 1
· (
1(n
|i|
) + 1)− 1 ≤ 0.
Hence,
max
|i|−even
1
n+ 1
· (1−
1(n
|i|
) ) ≤ pSh(i∅) ≤ min
|i|−odd
1
n+ 1
· (
1(n
|i|
) + 1),
and since
max
|i|−even
1
n+ 1
· (1−
1(n
|i|
) ) = 1
n+ 1
· (1−
1( n
Even([n
2
],[n
2
]+1)
) ),
19
min
|i|−odd
1
n+ 1
· (
1(n
|i|
) + 1) = 1
n+ 1
· (
1( n
Odd([n
2
],[n
2
]+1)
) + 1),
we get (29). Let us write (30) equivalently as
pSh(i) =
1
n+ 1
·
1(n
|i|
) + (−1)|i|+1 · ( 1
n+ 1
− pSh(i∅))
for each i ∈ I. Note that, of course,∑
i∈I
pSh(i) =
∑
i∈I
[
1
n+ 1
·
1(n
|i|
)+(−1)|i|+1 ·( 1
n+ 1
−pSh(i∅))] =
1
n+ 1
·
∑
i∈I
1(n
|i|
)+( 1
n+ 1
−pSh(i∅))·
∑
i∈I
(−1)|i|+1
=
1
n+ 1
·
|i|=n∑
|i|=0
1(n
|i|
) · (n
|i|
)
+ (
1
n+ 1
− pSh(i∅)) ·
|i|=n∑
|i|=0
(−1)|i|+1 ·
(
n
|i|
)
= 1.
!
Proof of Proposition 5.2
By virtue of Laruelle and Valenciano (2005), Shk(W ) = Φ
+
k (W,p) for all k and W if p(∅) = 0 and
p(S) =
1
|S|∑n
t=1
1
t
·
1( n
|S|
) for S ,= ∅. (50)
Hence, applying (24) and (14), and replacing S by i in (50), we get, for each k ∈ N , Ψ+k (gd(B), p
Sh) =
Φ+k (W,p
Sh) = Shk(W ), where p is defined in (33). Moreover, if p and p′ are two probability distributions,
then (Laruelle and Valenciano 2005) Φ+k (W,p) = Φ
+
k (W,p
′) for every k ∈ N and every W iff for all S ,= ∅
p(S)
1− p(∅)
=
p′(S)
1− p′(∅)
, (51)
where p(∅), p′(∅) < 1. Hence, we get (32). Note that, of course,
∑
i∈I
pSh(i) = pSh(i∅) +
∑
i∈I\{i∅}
pSh(i) = pSh(i∅) + (1− pSh(i∅)) ·
∑
i∈I\{i∅}
1
|i|∑n
t=1
1
t
·
1(n
|i|
) =
= pSh(i∅) +
1− pSh(i∅)∑n
t=1
1
t
·
|i|=n∑
|i|=1
1
|i|
·
1(n
|i|
) · (n
|i|
)
= 1.
!
Proof of Proposition 5.3
By virtue of Laruelle and Valenciano (2005), Shk(W ) = Φ
−
k (W,p) for all k and W if p(N) = 0 and
p(S) =
1
n−|S|∑n
t=1
1
t
·
1( n
|S|
) for S ,= N. (52)
Hence, applying (25) and (14), and replacing S by i in (52), we get, for each k ∈ N , Ψ−k (gd(B), p
Sh) =
Φ−k (W,p
Sh) = Shk(W ), where pSh is defined in (35). Moreover, if p and p′ are two probability distributions,
then (Laruelle and Valenciano 2005) Φ−k (W,p) = Φ
−
k (W,p
′) for every k ∈ N and every W iff for all S ,= ∅
p(S \ {k})
1− p(N)
=
p′(S \ {k})
1− p′(N)
,
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where p(N), p′(N) < 1. Hence, we get (34). Moreover, note that,
∑
i∈I
pSh(i) = pSh(iN ) +
∑
i∈I\{iN}
pSh(i) = pSh(iN ) + (1− pSh(iN )) ·
∑
i∈I\{iN}
1
n−|i|∑n
t=1
1
t
·
1(n
|i|
) =
= pSh(iN ) +
1− pSh(iN )∑n
t=1
1
t
·
|i|=n−1∑
|i|=0
1
n− |i|
·
1(n
|i|
) · (n
|i|
)
= 1.
!
Proof of Proposition 6.1
We have: S = f(i) ∈ M(W ) iff i ∈ Imw. From Laruelle and Valenciano (2005), we have that HPk(W ) =
Φk(W,pW ) for each k ∈ N and W , where
pW (S) =
{ 1
m(W ) if S ∈M(W )
0 if S ,∈M(W )
. (53)
From (23), for each k ∈ N , Ψk(gd(B), pHP ) = Φk(W,pW ) = HPk(W ), where pHP (i) is defined in (38). !
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